Etiket: Plan

Secret Documents Show Hamas Tried to Persuade Iran to Join Its Oct. 7 Attack

The Times reviewed the minutes of 10 meetings among Hamas’s top leaders. The records show the militant group avoided several escalations since 2021 to falsely imply it had been deterred — while seeking Iranian support for a major attack.

For more than two years, Yahya Sinwar huddled with his top Hamas commanders and plotted what they hoped would be the most devastating and destabilizing attack on Israel in the militant group’s four-decade history.

Minutes of Hamas’s secret meetings, seized by the Israeli military and obtained by The New York Times, provide a detailed record of the planning for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack, as well as Mr. Sinwar’s determination to persuade Hamas’s allies, Iran and Hezbollah, to join the assault or at least commit to a broader fight with Israel if Hamas staged a surprise cross-border raid.

The documents, which represent a breakthrough in understanding Hamas, also show extensive efforts to deceive Israel about its intentions as the group laid the groundwork for a bold assault and a regional conflagration that Mr. Sinwar hoped would cause Israel to “collapse.”

The documents consist of minutes from 10 secret planning meetings of a small group of Hamas political and military leaders in the run-up to the attack, on Oct. 7, 2023. The minutes include 30 pages of previously undisclosed details about the way Hamas’s leadership works and the preparations that went into its attack.

The documents, which were verified by The Times, lay out the main strategies and assessments of the leadership group:

  • Hamas initially planned to carry out the attack, which it code-named “the big project,” in the fall of 2022. But the group delayed executing the plan as it tried to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to participate.

  • As they prepared arguments aimed at Hezbollah, the Hamas leaders said that Israel’s “internal situation” — an apparent reference to turmoil over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s contentious plans to overhaul the judiciary — was among the reasons they were “compelled to move toward a strategic battle.”

  • In July 2023, Hamas dispatched a top official to Lebanon, where he met with a senior Iranian commander and requested help with striking sensitive sites at the start of the assault.

  • The senior Iranian commander told Hamas that Iran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle, but needed more time to prepare; the minutes do not say how detailed a plan was presented by Hamas to its allies.

  • The documents also say that Hamas planned to discuss the attack in more detail at a subsequent meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, but do not clarify whether the discussion happened.

  • Hamas felt assured of its allies’ general support, but concluded it might need to go ahead without their full involvement — in part to stop Israel from deploying an advanced new air-defense system before the assault took place.

  • The decision to attack was also influenced by Hamas’s desire to disrupt efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the entrenchment of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Israeli efforts to exert greater control over the Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem, sacred in both Islam and Judaism and known to Jews as the Temple Mount.

  • Hamas deliberately avoided major confrontations with Israel for two years from 2021, in order to maximize the surprise of the Oct. 7 attack. As the leaders saw it, they “must keep the enemy convinced that Hamas in Gaza wants calm.”

  • Hamas leaders in Gaza said they briefed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s Qatar-based political leader, on “the big project.” It was not previously known whether Mr. Haniyeh, who was assassinated by Israel in July, had been briefed on the attack before it happened.

Prelude to War

The documents provide greater context to one of the most pivotal moments in modern Middle Eastern history, showing it was both the culmination of a yearslong plan, as well as a move partly shaped by specific events after Mr. Netanyahu returned to power in Israel in late 2022.

Yahya Sinwar in April 2023 in Gaza City. Documents show that he and other Hamas leaders wanted time to lull Israeli leaders into a false sense of security before attacking Israel. Credit…Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

Brussels floats plan to bypass Hungary’s long-held veto on €6.6 billion for Ukraine

A proposed reform of the European Peace Facility would make financial contributions voluntary, rather than mandatory, as they are now.

European Union officials and diplomats are exploring a new plan to bypass Hungary’s firmly held veto on military assistance for Ukraine, which has accrued an extraordinary backlog of €6.6 billion and become an enormous source of frustration in Brussels.

The plan, still in the very early stages, will involve tweaking the European Peace Facility (EPF), the off-budget tool the bloc has been using to partially reimburse member states for the weapons and ammunition donated to Kyiv.

The main idea on the table is to allow member states to make financial contributions to the EPF on a voluntary basis, rather than a mandatory one.

According to officials and diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity to freely discuss the project, the switch from mandatory to voluntary would be acceptable for Budapest, as it would relieve the country from chipping into the common fund and supporting Ukraine’s resistance against the invading Russian troops.

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly decried the EU’s provisions of military equipment as a “pro-war policy.” His controversial trip to Moscow in July was denounced as an “appeasement mission” and an act of disloyalty.

“The idea behind this proposal is that no one can block,” said a high-ranking EU official. “This tranche of the EPF, which amounts to €6.6 billion, has been blocked for a year of a half. It’s a lot of time, a lot of money, and it’s undermining our support to Ukraine.”

However, making the EPF a voluntary tool could backfire, diplomats warned, because it could set a dangerous precedent and weaken the EU’s united front against the Kremlin, which has so far been based on an all-hands-on-deck philosophy.

For some countries, an EPF à la carte could prove a hard sell before national parliaments.

The reform “raises a number of questions about the cascading effects, the operation of the instrument in the longer term,” a diplomat said. “It also raises a number of budgetary issues for member states since it’s no longer a compulsory contribution.”

Foreign affairs ministers are set to have a first discussion on the plan on Monday during a meeting in Luxembourg. The premature nature of the plan suggests more internal reflections and negotiations will be needed before a conclusion is announced.

The switch in contribution to the EPF would require the unanimous support of all 27 member states.

It is unclear how much of the €6.6 billion would be released given the contribution from Hungary, and potentially other member states, might be removed.

The proposed overhaul does not mean leaders will give up on their Plan A: make Orbán lift his veto and resume reimbursements under the current EPF, although Budapest has made no indication this should happen any time soon. If anything, the renewed tension between Orbán and the European Commission suggests things will remain unchanged.

The Hungarian veto dates back to May 2023 when Ukraine’s anti-corruption agency blacklisted Hungary’s OTP Bank as an “international sponsor of war.”

The designation infuriated Orbán’s government and triggered a spat between Budapest and Kyiv, with Brussels awkwardly caught in the middle.

OTP Bank was eventually removed from the name-shaming catalogue but Hungary kept its veto firmly in place, arguing it needed “unconditional” guarantees it would not happen again. The continued blockage eventually created a €6.6 billion backlog, which capitals sought to compensate with bilateral contributions vis-à-vis Kyiv.

In July, High Representative Josep Borrell admitted he had “lost the hope” that Orbán would relent and described the impasse as “purely shameful.”

Nearly 50% of U.S. Investors Plan to Invest in Crypto ETFs: Charles Schwab Survey

Crypto was the leading asset class among millennial ETF investors, topping even stocks and bonds, the survey showed.

U.S. investors are very much keen on investing in exchange-traded funds (ETF) that hold cryptocurrencies, a new survey commissioned by financial services giant Charles Schwab showed on Thursday.

Some 45% of respondents said they plan to invest in crypto via ETFs over the next year, up from 38% a year earlier, surpassing demand for bonds and alternative assets. Only U.S. equities fared better, with 55% of participants planning to invest.

Among millennial ETF investors, though, crypto was the leading asset class, with 62% saying they plan to allocate to that sector versus only 48% for U.S. stocks, 47% for bonds and 46% for real assets such as commodities.

Boomer ETF investors were much less keen on digital assets, with only 15% of the respondents having plans to invest.

“Pretty stunning,” Eric Balchunas, senior ETF analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, said about crypto’s high ranking in investment plans in the survey.

The implications of the survey, which asked 2,200 individual investors between the age of 25 and 75 with at least $25,000 to be invested, could be a boost for the nascent and growing class of crypto-focused ETFs, which are being marketed as a diversification tool for traditional investment portfolios of stocks and bonds.

While U.S.-listed spot bitcoin ETFs hardly need the help, having attracted nearly $19 billion of net inflows since their debut in January, spot ether ETFs have languished on a relative and absolute basis since their launch a few months later. Exits from the incumbent Grayscale Ethereum Trust have overwhelmed inflows into the newer entrants, with net outflows for the group as a whole topping more than $500 million, according to Farside Investors.